The Korean War: Fear of the Red Menace as Justification for War Atrocities
The seeds of the Korean War began to sprout at the end of WWII. Suspicions and tensions between two allies, the Soviet Union and the United States, ratcheted up over rightful claims over the spoils of war, and over which form of government and economy would be implemented.
The Soviet Union wanted a stake in Germany, the Eastern bloc countries, and Korea where it fought Nazism and Japanese imperialism, respectively.
The United States feared that widespread Soviet influence would result in an exportation of Communism.
To safeguard the world from what it considered Soviet intentions, whether real or imagined, to export communism, the foreign policy of the U.S. was concentrated on the “containment” of communism.
Thus, East Asia and Southeast Asia became the locales where major, hostile engagements were waged between two opposing ideologies.
Korea was the first causality under the designation of containment.
Before the outbreak of the war, Korea became a casualty first of the post-WWII new global order, when its country and people were bisected at a latitudinal line called the 38th. parallel by a unilateral decision made in 1945 by then president, F.D.R; a decision to which the Soviet Union agreed.
In retrospect, it seems that the liberators, in particular the champion of democracy, the U.S., had no faith in the Korean people to independently establish their own political system after thirty-five years, more or less, of Japanese so-called “protectorate.”
In August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and agreed to oversee Japanese surrender north of latitudinal line. The U.S. arrived later that year, September or October, and occupied south of the line that included Seoul.
Hence, Korean self-determination was a non-issue.
With the division came separate governments in the new Korea. Under Soviet patronage Kim Il Sung, who fought as a guerilla against the Japanese in China, established a socialist ideology in the north; in the south, Syngman Rhee, a nationalist exile, returned and declared a Republic of Korea.
In 1948, under the supervision of the United Nations, an election in Seoul appointed officially Syngman Rhee as president of that Republic of Korea. Effectively, two separate Koreas were created that opposed each other ideologically.
As the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War approaches this June 25, 2010, the nation has yet to reconcile their dissension over the UN decision of 1948.
Regrettably, sixty years ago, on June 25, 1950, although the facts are still disputed, one of the biggest and tragic ironies of the 20th Century occurred when a civil war began. The North’s intention was to take over Seoul in an effort to reunite the country. They achieved part of their aim by reaching Seoul blitzkrieg-style but was repelled later by U.N. troops led by the U.S.
The “invasion” by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was censured by the United Nations council on Korea as a “breach of peace.”
Then president of the U.S., Harry S. Truman, pledged U.S. armed forces, which coalesced with UN troops in a military effort to repel North Korean forces. In a precedent setting move that successive U.S. presidents have used in order send U.S. troops overseas and place them in an offensive position or in to direct action, Truman never sought a formal declaration of war from Congress.
For dramatic effect, let’s call what Truman asked Congress for was a Korean Peninsula resolution, in the manner of LBJ’s Gulf of Tonkin resolution for Vietnam. These resolutions express usually the resolve of U.S. determination to support freedom and to protect the peace of nations threatened by Communism (today its terrorism or Muslim fundamentalism), to pledge U.S. military and economic aid, to use economic and diplomatic pressure to destabilize the offending nation, and a request for a Congressional support program.
Hence, the official position of U.S. armed forces presence fighting in Korea in 1950 was labeled a “police action.”
That police action’s main goal was not to destroy the enemy’s will to fight, it was to repel and contain the communist forces of North Korea by any means necessary. In other words, to contain communism meant that the gloves would have to come off. That meant not a gentleman’s war. Honor was out-of-date.
The No Gun Ri incident was the result of the new global, political, world order: a cold war of clashes without formal declarations of war.
The bridge at No Gun Ri
According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Seoul, testimonies recount U.S. bombings and strafing on South Korean villages and South Korean refugees fleeing the fighting in 1950-51.
Even though such indiscriminate killings were indisputable, the U.S.’s official position is that U.S. soldiers sent during the early period of fighting were young and inexperienced, not like hardened veterans from WWII. Their actions amounted to confusion, fear of communist infiltration, and the lack of any knowledge of Korean history and culture.
In short, the inexperienced U.S. soldier couldn’t distinguished a South Korean from a North Korean, unless, of course, the latter were wearing a uniform emblazoned with some kind of communist insignia.
Despite U.S. disputations, an article written in The Associated Press discovered evidence that shows it was U.S. policy to fire on refugees indiscriminately so as to prevent communist infiltrators.
The two key pieces of evidence are an order from General Keane and the Muccio letter. In the order by General Keane the last paragraph reads: “All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.”
In current parlance, civilian deaths are seen as collateral damage.
Flickr photo set by Ray Cunningham-Oct. 4, 2009; Brutalized Bodies at Sinchon Museum of American War Atrocities
Regardless if its a police action or a “war,” indiscriminate killings are inhuman. It is no excuse to say that one was under orders, or it was for God and Country.
If the Korean War does not formally come to an end, there could never be any peace on the Korean Peninsula, only a state of hyper-alertness. Hostilities have remained cold due to the signing of an Armistice. Fear of the outbreak of fighting is being used to justify expanding military budgets in both the U.S. and South Korea and continued U.S. military presence on South Korean soil.
Peace can never be found at the tip of a bayonet.
